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There is a crucial distinction between population migration and
personnel transfer. The latter is a systematic and deliberate govern-
ment program to move people from one location to another. Such a
movement can be induced by the financial or non-financial incentives
the government sets up specifically to accomplish such an objective
and/or it can be directly organized by the government via administra-
tive methods. China’s transfer policy toward Tibet is implemented on
the basis of both incentives and administrative compulsion. Migration,
on the other hand, refers to a spontaneous movement of people from
one place to another. There are complex causes for such a movement,
including economic opportunities and family-related considerations.
Even though Chinese migration to Tibet has caused great resentment
in Tibet, it should be recognized that such a movement of people has
been a result of a nationwide relaxation of economic control rather
than a result of a deliberate government program specifically aimed
at Tibet.’ As such, migration is a lesser indication of government
intentions toward Tibet than is personnel transfer policy specifically
designed for Tibet.
This article focuses on the personnel transfer policy of the Chinese
government in the 1980s and on the politically and strategically
sensitive personnel (i.e., cadres) transferred to Tibet. First, the reason
for this focus has to do with the fact that the Chinese transfer policy
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in the 1980s mainly pertained to cadres. As I will show below, in the
1980s the Chinese central government carefully limited transferees to
more educated and technical personnel. Second, there is more infor-
mation available on cadres than there is on ordinary citizens. Third,
focusing on cadres is a more meaningful line of research since cad-
res-not ordinary workers-presumably control vital political and
strategic positions; whether these positions are increasingly controlled
by Chinese sent from other parts of the country is a more indicative
measure of the intentions of the government.
To ensure reliability, I have purposely avoided official and public
statements. Instead, I base my analysis solely on three sources of
primary information. One is a collection of government documents,
consisting of thirteen volumes, titled Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuan-
bian (Selections of Documents on Personnel Work; Ministry of Labor
and Personnel, 1984, 1986; Ministry of Personnel, 1988, 1990). This
collection deals with a wide range of issues related to personnel
management: from recruitment, promotion, salary policy, and cadre
transfer to rehabilitation, retirement, pension policy, and so on. All of
the documents dealing with Tibet fall into the category of &dquo;cadre
transfer&dquo; (diaopei). The second source of information is a book put
out by the Department of Rotation and Transfer under the Ministry of
Personnel, titled Liudong diaopei gongzuo zhinan (Guidebook on
Rotation and Transfer Work; Ministry of Personnel, 1991). The book
is intended for government officials who handle personnel issues and
explains the terms, the history, and the various policy points related
to rotation and transfer work. The third source is an unpublished paper
prepared by researchers at the Institute of Sociology of Beijing Uni-
versity (1989). The paper contains statistics on the total number of
cadres in Tibet, the number of cadres transferred into and out of Tibet
between 1981 and 1987, and the ethnic composition of cadres in Tibet
for selected years. These statistics come from primary sources, such
as documents at the Bureau of Personnel in the Tibetan government.
The contents of the two document collections should be considered
credible because they are restricted in circulation (neibu faxing) and,
in all likelihood, they were marked &dquo;classified&dquo; at the time of their
issue. Although China’s secrecy law of 1988 does not have a neibu
(literally &dquo;internal&dquo;) category,’ neibu documents are conventionally
considered quasi-secret (Jia and Peng, 1989: 69). Given this status and
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the fact that the collections are not limited to documents on Tibet, there
is no reason to believe that the rationales for the transfer policy and
the numbers of the transferees given in these documents were designed
to achieve propaganda purposes; nor is there any reason to believe that
the statistics contained in the unpublished paper were aimed at achiev-
ing any propaganda purposes. The research was an independent pro-
ject undertaken by the researchers at the Institute of Sociology at
Beijing University.’
Because of the depth of emotions the Tibetan question generates
and because of the reluctance of the Chinese authorities to release
information, debate on Chinese rule in Tibet is often long on passion
and political partisanship but short on evidence. In this respect, any
research based on hard data should be particularly welcome. Although
it is possible that evidence released in the future may contradict the
findings here, based on the relatively systematic data currently avail-
able, one must conclude that the Chinese cadre transfer policy toward
Tibet in the 1980s appears to be quite close to what the Chinese
government publicly claims-that it has been limited in scale and that
its main purpose is to provide economic assistance.
This article portrays various aspects of the government’s transfer
policy as described in the aforementioned documents by discussing
the procedures and methods of transferring Chinese to Tibet as well
as its explicit and implicit purposes. It also looks at transfers out of
Tibet. Finally, it considers the processes and mechanisms for transfer-
ring people in both directions in light of the debate in the international
community about Chinese transfer policy toward Tibet.
IN- TRANSFERS
First, some definitions are necessary. The word &dquo;cadre&dquo; (ganbu)
here follows its standard Chinese bureaucratic usage, that is, it refers
to two types of personnel. One would be those who perform public
functions in a political or bureaucratic capacity. This usage is akin to
the concept of government officials or civil servants in other countries.
The other type of personnel consists of those who hold clerical
positions but who formally fall under the official nomenklatura list.
Examples of this type include teachers, technicians, managers, and so
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on.4 The word &dquo;transfer&dquo; (diaopei) refers to a routine Chinese bureau-
cratic practice whereby a cadre is transferred from one administrative
jurisdiction (lishu guanxi) to another. The specific methods can in-
clude a change in the position or the workplace. Such transfers can be
effected for either work-related or personal reasons (Ministry of
Personnel, 1991: 251). The term &dquo;inland regions&dquo; (neidi) refers to
China proper, although this geographic concept is rather loose because
it can also refer to areas such as Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai in the
context of this article.
PROCEDURES AND INCENTIVES
The Chinese government’s program to dispatch cadres to Tibet is
part of its general program of sending cadres to &dquo;border and remote
regions&dquo; (bianyuan diqu), although in important aspects transfers to
Tibet seem to be more centrally supervised. There are certain estab-
lished practices and procedures by which this program is enforced.
These involve the classification of border and remote regions accord-
ing to the levels of their associated hardship, the system of financial
and non-financial incentives to encourage transfers, and the term of
service.
Border and remote regions are defined by the Chinese government
according to geographic, natural, political, and economic criteria (see
Ministry of Labor and Personnel, 1983). The geographic criterion
mainly refers to the fact that these regions are located along China’s
borders; natural conditions pertain to the high altitudes and low
temperatures of these regions. Political and economic criteria, on the
other hand, are devised to take into account ethnic factors and the level
of poverty. An application of these criteria yields a formal division
of border and remote regions into three categories, with the third-
category regions having the most difficult conditions according to the
specified criteria.’ All of Tibet is classified as a third-category region
(Ministry of Personnel, 1991: 177).
A system of financial incentives has been established to encourage
cadres-and especially technical specialists-to work in the border
and remote regions. These incentives include higher retirement pen-
sions and the enjoyment of special benefits provided by the provincial
governments of these regions (see Ministry of Labor and Personnel
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and State Nationalities Affairs Commission, 1983: 361-362). For
Tibet, it seems that the levels and the forms of these incentives are
spelled out in greater detail centrally and, as a total package, they may
be greater than similar incentives for other regions. The main reason
why Tibet seems to be treated differently and more centrally is not
only the presence of ethnic tensions in the region; an equally or more
important reason relates to the harshness of living conditions in Tibet
and, therefore, its presumed unattractiveness to Chinese. This expla-
nation is consistent with the fact that, in a number of documents, the
central government lumps Tibet together with Qinghai, another prov-
ince with similarly difficult living and environmental conditions (but
free of any ethnic tensions), and discusses cadre transfer policies for
these two provinces separately from other provinces that also qualify
as hardship posts.6
The incentives offered to those who are transferred to work in Tibet
are of two types. First, Chinese transferees receive the same salary
treatment as cadres with the same administrative ranks already work-
ing in Tibet (Department of Organization, Ministry of Labor and
Personnel, 1983a: 358). This can mean significant income supple-
ments when moving to Tibet. There are two sources of these income
supplements. One is that Tibet is in the highest-the eleventh-
&dquo;salary zone&dquo; (gongzi qu); the level of salary in the eleventh salary
zone is indexed to the salary level in the sixth salary zone. The method
of calculation is to take the level of the sixth salary zone as the base
and then add 13.04% of that base as the supplement. The second source
of income supplements consists of a cost-of-living adjustment, which
may vary in the same salary zone. For Lhasa, it is 52% of the salary
level, as determined by the eleventh salary zone method outlined
above.’ Taking the two sources of the income supplements together, a
cadre moving from a sixth salary zone to Lhasa can receive an income
supplement equivalent to 71.82% of his/her original salary.’
Second, the Tibetan government also has established financial and
non-financial incentives specifically aimed at technical cadres. Chil-
dren of technical cadres who have worked in Tibet for a long time are
given priority in job assignments and requests for urban residency
status. Monthly allowances also are given in addition to salary (inclu-
sive of the supplements); these allowances apparently vary from
region to region (Tibet is divided into four regions based on the level
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TABLE 1: Monthly Allowances and Regional Categories in Tibet
NOTE: Units are presented in yuan.
SOURCE: Ministry of Personnel (1991: 183).
of &dquo;hardship&dquo;; Ministry of Personnel, 1991: 182-183) (see Table 1).
Because the income supplements are not tied to the size of one’s
income, this system enhances the proportionate income-augmenting
effect of moving across different regional categories, as compared
with moving across different administrative ranks within the same
regional category.
The term of service in Tibet is fixed. For Party and government cadres
(dangzheng ganbu), it is five years; for technical cadres (zhuanye jishu
ganbu), three years (Ministry of Personnel, 1991: 73). That the term
of service is fixed can be considered another form of incentive in the
sense that it guarantees transferees the right to return to their original
residencies. To accentuate this right, transferees’ residency status
(hukou) and their institutional affiliation are not affected by the
transfer (Department of Organization and Ministry of Labor and
Personnel, 1983a: 358).
PURPOSES
The transfer of cadres to border and remote regions was suspended
for ten years during the Cultural Revolution; it was resumed only after
the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December
1978 (Ministry of Personnel, 1991: 72). The first large, organized
in-transfer in the post-Mao era apparently occurred in 1979 when
about 3,000 cadres were sent to Tibet. A full explanation is not
available for this sudden infusion of Chinese transferees; the text of
the document issued by the Department of Organization in 1979
authorizing this transfer is not included in Renshi gongzuo or in
Liudong diaopei.9 The most plausible conjecture is that the policy on
190
transferring cadres into Tibet and the policy on transferring cadres out
of Tibet were implemented in conjunction with one another: the
increase in the number of people transferred to Tibet in 1979 was
probably to replenish the stock of Chinese cadres in anticipation of
the large-scale, three-year withdrawal of Chinese cadres from Tibet
that the central government was to implement in 1980,1981, and 1982
(discussed below.) Indeed, in 1980,3,000 cadres were withdrawn from
Tibet (Department of Organization, 1980: 119).
Other evidence supporting this interpretation is contained in a 1980
Department of Organization document, which enunciates a number of
specific measures to transfer cadres to inland areas. The document
declares: &dquo;Based on the thrust of the 1979 document issued by the
Department of Organization, there will be 3,000 cadres transferred to
inland regions for job reassignments before the end of July this year&dquo;
(Department of Organization, 1980: 119).
A more general purpose behind the transfer program in the 1980s
was to promote T’ibet’s economic development by infusing technical
expertise into the region. Evidence for this can be seen in the policy
orientation of stressing technical personnel as laid out in the government
documents, and also in the type of central government agencies that have
been involved in organizing the transfer activities. In addition, a profes-
sional profile of those transferred to Tibet provides further evidence.
In a 1980 report to the Party Center and the State Council, the
Tibetan Party committee and government made a request for more
doctors and teachers, as well as for more technicians for new invest-
ment projects (Party Committee and People’s Government of theTibe-
tan Autonomous Region, 1980: 123). The central policy to send
technical personnel to Tibet was formed in 1980; those transferred
were to be &dquo;few in number but high in quality&dquo; (shao er jing). This
emphasis implied that political functionaries were to be limited to a
level that was &dquo;absolutely necessary&dquo; (biyaode). Furthermore, ordi-
nary workers were not encouraged to move to Tibet (Ministry of
Personnel, 1991: 73). In 1983, the Department of Organization and
the Ministry of Labor and Personnel (1983a: 358) re-affirmed this
policy orientation:
Selecting and dispatching cadres to Tibet must be handled strictly and
should be carried out on the principle that they should be few in
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TABLE 2: Government Agencies Involved in Cadre Transfers to Tibet in the 1980s
SOURCES: Ministry of Personnel (1991: 73) and Department of Organization and Ministry of
Labor and Personnel (1983a: 357-358).
number but high in quality. Cadres to be transferred to Tibet must be
in the most urgent demand in Tibet; those not in need now should be
delayed being sent in. [To ascertain this demand,] investment projects
and the people to be transferred must be screened and determined on a
case-by-case basis.
The emphasis on technical personnel means that government agen-
cies sending transferees tend to be specialized and technical ones. This
is readily seen in Table 2, which shows an overwhelming dominance
of technical agencies involved in the several rounds of transfers in the
1980s.
A more direct measure of the purpose of the transfer program is the
composition of those cadres who are transferred to Tibet. Statistical
breakdowns by occupations are available for the 414 cadres trans-
ferred to Tibet in 1988. Table 3 gives the number of transferee cadres
and their respective percentages. The largest number of transferees are
involved in economic management (32.61 %); next are those in the
tourist industry (26.57%). When transferees are divided into control-
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TABLE 3: Occupational Composition of Cadres Transferred to Tibet in 1988
NOTE: The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Department of Organization and Ministry of Personnel (1988).
related and non-control-related purposes in terms of the functions they
perform (control-related cadres are classified as those who perform
Party, government, and public security functions), then it is clear that
control-related cadres are in a decided minority. Control-related cad-
res are only about 18% of the total; 82% of transferees perform
economic and technical functions.1O
OUT TRANSFERS
In the 1980s, the Chinese central government adopted a policy of
systematically and periodically withdrawing Chinese cadres from
Tibet. In this section, I will discuss the characteristics of, and the
rationales for, these out-transfers.
CHARACTERISTICS
There appear to have been five large-scale withdrawals in the
1980s: in 1980,1981, 1982, 1983, and 1989. The withdrawal program
in the early 1980s was initially envisioned to be completed in three
years, from 1980 to 1982 (Party Committee and People’s Government
of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 1980: 124). Because of unspeci-
fied complications, however, the program was not completed until
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1983. Another idea that was originally envisioned, during the last
round of wholesale withdrawals in 1983, was to establish a routine
procedure to handle cadre out-transfers on a case-by-case basis in lieu
of a centrally supervised program. However, as I will show later, a
series of unforeseen events led to the resumption of wholesale with-
drawals in 1989.
The methods of transfer have followed the routines established in
the earliest rounds. Throughout, one principle has been enforced quite
consistently, that is, transferred cadres should return to their places of
origin. The geographic distribution of returnees was released for the
1983 and 1989 rounds and is reproduced in Table 4; the application of
the aforementioned rule enables us to deduce a pattern by which cadres
are dispatched to Tibet.
The first salient characteristic is the relative insignificance of central
government personnel in staffing administrative and political positions
in Tibet; in 1983, only twenty-five cadres out of 2,705 returned to central
Party and government agencies (zhongyang guojia jiguan) and, in 1989,
the figure was only three. That in-transferees consist primarily of pro-
vincial-level officials implies that the in-transfer program involves
horizontal transfers (pingdiao), that is, transfers occur across regions
but at the same level of the bureaucratic hierarchy.&dquo;
A second noteworthy feature is there appears to be a regional
pattern: provinces such as Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Sichuan,
and Shaanxi have consistently sent and therefore received a large
number of cadres. Except for Sichuan, which may bear a dispropor-
tionate burden due to its proximity to Tibet, it is not possible to
pinpoint the reasons why some provinces have consistently sent more
cadres to Tibet than others.
A principle that has guided the transfer policy concerns the family
members of the recalled cadres. The spouse and children of recalled
cadres are known as &dquo;accompanying transfer personnel&dquo; (suidiao
renyuan) (Party Committee and People’s Government of the Tibetan
Autonomous Region, 1980 : 124). Significantly, the policy of allowing
children to leave with their parents applies to transferees from Qinghai
only conditionally: children without a regular job in Qinghai are
allowed to leave with their parents (Department of Organization,
1979: 117). The differential policy most likely reflects differences in
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TABLE 4: Geographic Distribution of Chinese Returnees, 1983 and 1989
SOURCES: Departrnent of Organization and Ministry of Labor and Personnel (1983b: 171),
and Department of Organization, Ministry of Personnel, and Ministry of Labor ( 1989: 232-233).
motivations behind the transfer policies for Tibet and Qinghai. In the
case of Qinghai, the impetus is compensatory in nature-to grant
home returns to those who have served in a &dquo;hardship post&dquo; for a long
time; in the case of Tibet, the motive is to maximize the number of
Chinese returnees on account of potential ethnic tensions in the
region.
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Policy documents also give statistical information on the scale of
the out-transfer policy for a number of years during the 1980s. Table
5 mainly relies on the Institute of Sociology (1989) for its data; in this
section, however, I will draw on policy documents as sources of
information to assess the scale of the out-transfer policy.
In general, the out-transfer policy includes both cadres and workers,
with workers usually outnumbering cadres by a significant margin. In
1983, 2,705 cadres were withdrawn along with 3,906 workers (De-
partment of Organization and Ministry of Labor and Personnel,
1983b: 171); in 1989, there were 3,507 cadres and 7,610 workers
withdrawn (Department of Organization, Ministry of Personnel, and
Ministry of Labor, 1989: 232). In 1980 and 1982, both cadres and
workers were withdrawn but the number of the workers was not
disclosed; the only clue is given in a document (Department of
Organization and Ministry of Labor and Personnel, 1983b: 167) that
mentions that the scale of the out-transfers in 1980 and 1982 was larger
than that for 1983.
The real implication of the out-transfer policy actually is greater
than the above numbers suggest. This is because the out-transfer
policy not only includes cadres and workers who are recalled to inland
regions (neidiao), but also those who are resettled (anzhi) in inland
regions upon retirement. In 1989, 10,667 cadres and workers were
withdrawn; in addition, 4,156 retired cadres and workers were reset-
tled in inland regions (1,710 cadres and 2,446 workers), resulting in
a total of 14,823 cadres and workers being transferred out of Tibet
(Department of Organization, Ministry of Personnel, and Ministry of
Labor, 1989: 232).
RATIONALES
Two rationales are associated with transferring cadres out of Tibet,
both of which are closely connected with the ethnic tensions in the
region. The first is to increase gradually the proportion of ethnic
Tibetan cadres in local Party and government agencies; such a desire
motivated the large-scale withdrawals of cadres in the late 1970s and
the early 1980s. In a report to the Party Center and the State Council,
the Tibetan authorities set the goal of increasing the proportion of the
Tibetan non-production-related cadres (tuochan ganbu)12 to more than
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two thirds in two to three years (Party Committee and People’s
Government of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 1980: 123). The
effect of this ethnic &dquo;quota&dquo; falls most heavily on those cadres who
perform political functions. The aforementioned report, for example,
treats political and technical cadres very differently: all political
cadres, it declares, except for the few key personnel, should leave,
whereas technical cadres are allowed to leave only if they meet certain
specified conditions.13 Thus the transfer policy is not only to reduce
the Chinese presence in general, but particularly to reduce the Chinese
political presence.’4
How successful was the central government in accomplishing this
goal? As we have noted, the goal that the Tibetan authorities set out
to achieve by 1983 was that more than two thirds of the cadres in Tibet
were to be of Tibetan origin; in reality, a figure of 58% was attained
(calculated from Institute of Sociology, 1989: 5 and 7). As a whole,
the 1980s witnessed a gradual decrease in the number of the Chinese
cadres; in 1978, about 55.4% of the cadres in Tibet were Chinese; by
1987, it was down to 38.65% (Institute of Sociology, 1989: 5).
The second objective of withdrawing Chinese cadres from Tibet is
similar in that it seeks to reduce the Chinese political presence in Tibet,
but the specific impetus was a reaction to several large protests in
Lhasa and the intention was to defuse ethnic tensions. This motive lay
behind the withdrawal of Chinese cadres in 1989.
On March 31, 1989, the Department of Organization, Ministry of
Personnel, and Ministry of Labor (1989) jointly issued a document
that announced the decision to withdraw 10,667 Chinese cadres and
workers from Tibet. The origin of this decision, however, can be traced
to March 1988 when the Politburo Standing Committee met and
instructed that the withdrawal program be sped up.
The program to return Chinese cadres and workers to, and settle them
in, the inland regions was first raised as early as March last year. At that
time, the Politburo Standing Committee, in studying to further stabilize
the situation in Tibet, pointed out that those personnel who were
transferred to Tibet and who are outside the nomenklatura as a result
of system reforms must be resettled as soon as possible. After Tibet
proposed a course of action to return the personnel to the inland regions,
at the end of last year, the Politburo Standing Committee again studied
the transfer and settlement of Chinese cadres and workers and in-
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structed that this task be done well and difficulties be overcome to
speed up the implementation [Department of Organization, Ministry
of Personnel, and Ministry of Labor, 1989: 228; emphasis added].
Several large-scale protests in Lhasa occurred around the time the
Politburo met to deliberate this issue and the time the aforementioned
document was issued: October 1, 1987, March 5, 1988, and again
March 5, 1989. The extremely close coincidence between these pro-
tests and the timing of the Politburo meetings and of the eventual
decision suggests a link between the protests and the decision to
withdraw more than 10,000 Chinese cadres and workers in 1989. In
addition, the unforeseen protests in Lhasa apparently forced the hand
of the central government and caused it to reverse a decision it had
made only a few months earlier. On July 29, 1987, four months before
the Politburo proposed another round of transfers, the Department of
Organization and Ministry of Labor and Personnel (1987) issued a
policy document, setting forth the population transfer as &dquo;routine
work&dquo; that should proceed henceforth on a case-by-case basis. The
document gives no indication that another large-scale round of out-
transfers was being contemplated.
There was also a sense of urgency associated with the implemen-
tation of the withdrawals. The Department of Organization, the Min-
istry of Personnel, and the Ministry of Labor (1989: 228) demanded
a speedy implementation: those units to receive less than 400 out-
transferees were directed to complete the task by the end of the year,
whereas those receiving more than 400, if they encountered difficul-
ties, were to complete the task in 1989 and 1990. It is a reasonable
conjecture that the riots in Lhasa not only provided the impetus for
reversing the original decision not to withdraw cadres on a wholesale
scale, but also added a sense of urgency to implementation of the
withdrawals.
MAGNITUDE OF TRANSFERS INTO TIBET
The magnitude of personnel transfers into Tibet must take into
account the number of people the central government has sent to Tibet
as well as the number of people the central government has withdrawn
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TABLE 5: Total Number of Cadres and Net Transfers, 1979 to 1988
~ ~
SOURCES: Institute of Sociology (1989: 7), Department of Organization (1980: 119), and
Department of Organization, Ministry of Personnel, and Ministry of Labor (1989: 232).
*Includes both Chinese and Tibetan cadres.
from Tibet; an accurate measure should be the net in-transfers, that is,
the number of people transferred to Tibet minus the number of the
people that were withdrawn in a given year. During the 1980s, has the
central government, on average, transferred more cadres into Tibet
than it has transferred out? If the central government has transferred
more cadres into Tibet, then obviously the net in-transfers should be
positive; otherwise, they should be negative.
Although statistics are sketchy, there are some available for certain
years; in particular, the Institute of Sociology (1989) gives the most
detailed statistics on the total number of cadres in Tibet and the number
of cadres transferred into and out of Tibet between 1981 and 1987. In
the 1980s, for four out of six years for which statistics are available,
the central government transferred more cadres out of Tibet than it
transferred in. This is seen in column five of Table 5, which shows the
net in-transfers to be negative for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. Net
in-transfers were positive in 1986 and 1987, but only modestly as those
transferred to Tibet outnumbered those transferred out by only fifty
and seventy-six, respectively. Although no statistics are available on
the number of cadres transferred to Tibet in 1989, given the large
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TABLE 6: Party-State Intensity as Measured by the Ratio of Party and Government
Cadres to the Population of Tibet, 1981 to 1987
SOURCES: Calculated from the number of cadres from Institute of Sociology (1989), and
Tibetan population figures from Statistical Bureau of Xizang Autonomous Region (1993).
number of cadres withdrawn that year (3,507), the net in-transfer also
could have been negative.
The scale of withdrawal of cadres from Tibet is significant. In 1981 1
alone, more than 8,000 cadres were withdrawn, which amounted to
more than 12% of the total cadres in Tibet after deducting the number
of transferees to Tibet (column six of Table 5). Looked at another way,
in 1981, after deducting the number of in-transferees, almost 22% of
all Chinese cadres working in Tibet were transferred out.15 The scale
of out-transfers was reduced progressively to only about 1 % in 1985,
signaling the completion of the government’s program of withdrawing
Chinese cadres by the mid-1980s. The withdrawals on this scale have
reduced the ratio of cadres to the total population of Tibet. Some social
scientists have used the ratio of cadres to total population to measure
&dquo;party-state intensity&dquo;;’6 as seen in Table 6, the ratio has declined from
3.23% in 1981 to 2.59% in 1987.
CONCLUSION
China’s cadre transfer policy with respect to Tibet in the 1980s
seems to have been targeted and selective: it focused on educated and
technical personnel, and purposely restricted the transfer of political
functionaries and ordinary workers. Also in the 1980s, the Chinese
government pursued an equally conscious and systematic policy of
withdrawing a large number of Chinese cadres from Tibet, espe-
cially those who performed political functions. It should be stressed
that when the number of out-transferees is taken into account, the
number of the net in-transferees is small and for the bulk of the 1980s
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more cadres were withdrawn from Tibet than those transferred to
Tibet.
First of all, the transfer policy seems to have grown from the
government’s sensitivity to Tibetans’ reactions to the Chinese pres-
ence in the region. The policy of reducing the Chinese political
presence in Tibet is calculated either to preempt future ethnic conflicts,
as in the case of the in-transfer programs in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s, or to appease Tibetan sentiment in the wake of protests
against Chinese rule, as in the case of the withdrawal program in
1989. During the 1980s, the Chinese government pursued a rela-
tively concessionary policy and responded to Tibetans’ dissatisfaction
with Chinese rule by reducing rather than increasing the Chinese
presence in Tibet.
The second purpose reflects an economic development objective,
as indicated by the professional composition of those who have been
moved to Tibet. The Chinese government views the lack of educated
and technical personnel in Tibet as one of the major reasons why the
region has lagged behind economically. Whether this view is accurate
is beyond the scope of this article.&dquo; The point here is that political
control was not the sole motive behind the Chinese transfer policy-at
least in the 1980s-and the economic development objective probably
was the dominant policy goal.
The findings of this article cannot be used to address fully the issue
of the presence of Han people in Tibet because of lack of hard data on
spontaneous migration and on troops-two issues that have caused
tremendous resentment among Tibetans.&dquo; However, as I pointed out
at the beginning of this article, it is more appropriate to assess the
intentions of the Chinese central government toward Tibet by exam-
ining its population transfer policy specifically directed toward Tibet
rather than examining a nationwide phenomenon such as spontaneous
migration. In that regard, the lack of data on troops handicaps our
analysis and it should be explicitly recognized that transfer of civilian
cadres is only one part of the question of the movement of Chinese
into Tibet. Although, as far as civilian cadres are concerned, the
presently available evidence suggests that there has not been a con-
scious policy of population transfer, it should be pointed out that our
knowledge of a larger issue-whether the central government uses the
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movement of Chinese into Tibet to achieve the purposes of political
control-still remains partial. A more definitive assessment should
await the release of all the relevant documents on the subject and data
on troops stationed in Tibet, as well as data on the distribution of ranks
between Han and Tibetan cadres.
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise noted, when "Chinese" is used, it means Han Chinese.
2. For a definition of state secrets, see Article 9 of the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Preservation of State Secrets (Ministry of Justice, 1990).
3. Personal communications with Jing Jun.
4. See Sun (1987:54) and Jia and Peng (1989:58) For sources in English, see Bums (1987)
The Chinese nomenklatura further divides cadres into five categories: government officials,
Party officials, clerical personnel in non-profit institutions (shiye danwei), managerial personnel
in for-profit institutions (qiye danwei), and officials of mass organizations (qunzhong duanti)
(see Chen, Zhang, and Yan, 1986: 306).
5. For example, third-category regions are 3,000 meters above sea level; second-category
regions are 2,000 meters above sea level.
6. University graduates who are assigned jobs in Tibet and Qinghai receive the same
package of benefits, including an automatic salary increase by one grade and the right to return
to their original province once they have served for eight years (Ministry of Labor and Personnel
and State Nationalities Affairs Commission, 1983: 361). The cadre recall policy seems to apply
to Tibet and Qinghai most systematically and centrally. For these two provinces only, the
Department of Organization sets forth the number of transferees, the manner of compensation
and resettlement in the receiving provinces, and other guidelines. During the post-Mao period,
three rounds of transfers out of Qinghai are known to have occurred. The first was in 1979 and
involved about 2,200 cadres; the second was in 1981 and involved thousands (the precise figure
has not been disclosed); and the third was in 1985 when about 900 cadres were withdrawn
(Department of Organization, 1979, 1981; Department of Organization and Ministry of Labor
and Personnel, 1985).
7. The variations are probably a function of different hardship classifications. For example,
Urumqi and Lhasa belong to the same salary zone, but for cadres working in Urumqi the living
cost adjustment is only 26% of their salary level as compared with 52% for Lhasa. Urumqi,
however, is a first-category region whereas Tibet is a third-category region.
8. For details, see State Council (1985).
9. The Ministry of Personnel implements cadre transfer policies, which means that it is in
charge of selecting and assigning cadres and laying down the logistical work for such transferees.
The formulation of cadre transfer policies, at least regarding Tibet, belongs squarely to the Party;
in particular, the Department of Organization under the Central Committee issued all of the
documents that set the timing and defined the scope of transfers.
10. In 1979, a reasonable estimate for the share of political cadres of the total number of
transferees is 9.83%. This is derived by assuming that the tenure for technical cadres dispatched
to Tibet in 1979 expired in 1983 and that all of them elected to leave at the end of their tenure.
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In 1979, 3,000 cadres were sent to Tibet; in 1983, 2,705 cadres were withdrawn. The difference
is taken to consist of primarily political cadres.
11. For a definition of pingdiao, see Ministry of Personnel (1991: 252).
12. This is a narrow definition of cadres. Tuochan literally means being detached from
production activity; tuochan ganbu thus refers to cadres who work in bureaucratic, research, and
educational institutions, that is, excluding those working in enterprises.
13. These conditions include ill health, family difficulties, mismatches between positions
and skills, and so on (Party Committee and People’s Government of the Tibetan Autonomous
Region, 1980: 123-124).
14. This reflects the differential policy treatment between Tibet and Qinghai In the case of
Tibet, withdrawals do not hinge on the family circumstances or health of the returnees, although
they do in the case of Qinghai (Department of Organization, 1979,1981). Ethnic considerations
are most likely a factor in this difference.
15. The figure is derived from assuming that the share of Chinese cadres remained the same
at 55.45% from 1978 to 1981. This yields the number of Chinese cadres in Tibet in 1981 to be
roughly 29,959, which is then used to calculate the percentage of those who were transferred
out of Tibet.
16. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Modern China for pointing this out to me.
17. Indeed, two Chinese economists have questioned the wisdom of infusing large-scale
assistance from the central government as a way to develop the region (Wang and Bai, 1991).
18. There is no information on the stationing of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet in
these documents. It could be plausibly argued that the troops perform political control functions
in lieu of Han Chinese cadres. Another issue that cannot be addressed in detail concerns the
movement of people into so-called "Greater Tibet," which encompasses not just the Tibetan
Autonomous Region (TAR) but all of Qinghai, parts of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu. Apart from
Qinghai, there is no documentary evidence in these volumes that there is a systematic and
deliberate government policy to transfer cadres to other regions of "Greater Tibet" similar to the
one relating to TAR.
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